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Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law”:
A Parable
Geoffrey L. Brackett*
“[D]elivering of knowledge in distinct and disjoyned Aphorismes doth leave the wit of man
more free to turne and tosse, and make use of that
which is so delivered to more severall purposes
and applications; for wee see that all the ancient
wisdom and science was wont to be delivered in
that forme, as may be seen by the parables of
Solomon, and by the Aphorismes of Hippocrates,
and the morall verses of Theogenes and
Phocilides. . .”
Sir Francis Bacon (1636)1
Despite Francis Bacon’s cautionary note, I have always
been a fan of parables, and perhaps the most poignant one to
speak for perils of the legal profession is Franz Kafka’s “Vor
dem Gesetz” (“Before the Law”), one of the relatively few works
to be published in his lifetime. It was seen first in the almanac
Vom Jüngsten Tag: Ein Almanach Neuer Dichtung in
December 1915 before it was included in his novel Der Prozess
(The Trial), which was unpublished in his lifetime. He wrote it
at one sitting on December 13, 1914,2 and in fewer than 650
words, Kafka illustrates the menace of the law to those for
whom it is a mystery and the indifferent cruelty possible from
Geoffrey L. Brackett is currently Executive Vice President of Marist College,
a post he entered in August, 2010. Prior to that, he served as a faculty
member and administrator at Pace University for twenty years, most
recently as Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs.
1. FRANCIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND B3
(Lawbook
Exch.
ed.,
2003)
(1630),
available
at
https://archive.org/stream/elementsofcommon00baco#page/n19/mode/2up.
2. See Patrick J. Glen, The Deconstruction and Reification of Law in
Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law” and the Trial, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 23,
33 (2007).
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those who have access to it. He does this while subtly
referencing, through metaphor, the social, political, and
educational barriers that have always separated those who
have access to the law and those whose ignorance of it can cost
them everything. And he does it with a sheen of absurdist
humor that reflects the existentialist artistic response against
the alienation of the modern world that was unfolding around
him.
Kafka’s brief narrative opens a world of interpretive
possibility, the kind of which Bacon argued against as a model
of jurisprudential doctrine in the seventeenth century. In
twentieth century post-structuralist theory, the text was so
attractive that Jacques Derrida could not resist highlighting it
as a living illustration of différance. Derrida was drawn to
examine the complicated, refracted “relationship taken up in
the parable between title and text, door and law, doorkeeper
and man from the country, and by allegorical extension, text
and reader, text and writer.”3 The power of Kafka’s text makes
it seem simultaneously like a Medieval folk tale that could
have been appropriated by Chaucer as well as a movie script
for a chilling twentieth-century noir film starring Orson Welles
(in fact, The Trial was made into a film in 1962 directed by
Orson Welles and starred Anthony Perkins—with a haunting
reading of the parable included in the film). In case you are not
familiar, a quick refresher on this work:
BEFORE THE LAW stands a doorkeeper. To this
doorkeeper there comes a man from the country
and prays for admittance to the Law. But the
doorkeeper says that he cannot grant admittance
at the moment. The man thinks it over and then
asks if he will be allowed in later. “It is possible,”
says the doorkeeper, “but not at the moment.”
Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the
doorkeeper steps to one side, the man stoops to
peer through the gateway into the interior.
Observing that, the doorkeeper laughs and says:

3. Raphael Foshay, Derrida on Kafka’s “Before the Law”, 63 ROCKY MTN.
REV. 194, 199 (2009).
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“If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite
my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am
only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to
hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each
more powerful than the last. The third
doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I
cannot bear to look at him.” These are difficulties
the man from the country has not expected; the
Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all
times and to everyone, but as he now takes a
closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, with
his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar
beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he
gets permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives
him a stool and lets him sit down at one side of
the door. There he sits for days and years. He
makes many attempts to be admitted, and
wearies the doorkeeper by his importunity. The
doorkeeper frequently has little interviews with
him, asking him questions about his home and
many other things, but the questions are put
indifferently, as great lords put them, and
always finish with the statement that he cannot
be let in yet. The man, who has furnished himself
with many things for his journey, sacrifices all he
has, however valuable, to bribe the doorkeeper.
The doorkeeper accepts everything, but always
with the remark: “I am only taking it to keep you
from thinking you have omitted anything.”
During these many years the man fixes his
attention almost continuously on the doorkeeper.
He forgets the other doorkeepers, and this first
one seems to him the sole obstacle preventing
access to the Law. He curses his bad luck, in his
early years boldly and loudly, later, as he grows
old, he only grumbles to himself. He becomes
childish, and since in his yearlong contemplation
of the doorkeeper he has come to know even the
fleas in his fur collar, he begs the fleas as well to
help him and to change the doorkeeper’s mind.
At length his eyesight begins to fail, and he does
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not know whether the world is really darker or
whether his eyes are only deceiving him. Yet in
his darkness he is now aware of a radiance that
streams inextinguishably from the gateway of
the Law. Now he has not very long to live. Before
he dies, all his experiences in these long years
gather themselves in his head to one point, a
question he has not yet asked the doorkeeper. He
waves him nearer, since he can no longer raise
his stiffening body. The doorkeeper has to bend
low towards him, for the difference in height
between them has altered much to the man’s
disadvantage. “What do you want to know now?”
asks the doorkeeper; “you are insatiable.”
“Everyone strives to reach the Law,” says the
man, “so how does it happen that for all these
many years no one but myself has ever begged
for admittance?” The doorkeeper recognizes that
the man has reached his end, and to let his
failing senses catch the words roars in his ear:
“No one else could ever be admitted here, since
this gate was made only for you. I am now going
to shut it.”4
For my money, this is a tour de force. Creatively, I think it
ranks with works of brilliant brevity such as Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address, Shakespeare’s 18th Sonnet, and Emily
Dickinson’s “I Heard a Fly Buzz When I Died.” The haunting
architecture of our human relationship with the law is laid
bare here, and the complexity of that relationship is both
inviting and discouraging.
I.

Difficulties Not Expected

Clarity of purpose and lack of access have always plagued
the legal profession.
The dominant theme of Kafka’s
unfinished novel into which this parable ultimately fits is the
4. FRANZ KAFKA, THE COMPLETE STORIES 22-23 (Nahum Glatzer ed.,
Willa Muir et al. trans.,1971).
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intractable difficulty of the law. The Trial uses this parable as
a talisman for the larger mystery enveloping Josef K. after he
awakens to find that he has fallen afoul of the law for some
unknown and possibly unknowable reason. “Before the Law”
appears at a point in the novel when K. is deeply involved in
the intricacies of his case, but appears to be on an errand that
has nothing to do with it. The bank where K. works asks him
to meet an Italian client. K. arranges to meet him at a
cathedral, and the client never shows up. At the cathedral, a
place seemingly as far removed from his legal case as one could
imagine, K. has the parable repeated back to him by a priest.
The priest turns out to be an employee of the courts—the
prison chaplain, he claims—and tells K. that the parable is
among the most ancient of its texts. After an exegesis several
pages longer than the original parable, the priest underlines
the ineffability of the text’s message. He concludes “One need
not consider everything true; one must only consider it
necessary.” The necessity of the process—and the parable—
arises from its ancient, undiscoverable source. It is precedent,
or it is myth, or it is religion, or it is all three. The source of
the parable, its meaning, and its application are all mysterious
to K. The priest, whose religious function is subjugated to the
secular mystery of the law, is of no help in understanding its
meaning.
Our modern relationship with the law is both maddeningly
mundane and steeped in mystery. From the administrative
trivia associated with a simple parking ticket to the larger
issues determined by our legal system that lay bare social ills
(the Grand Jury decisions in Ferguson, Missouri and New York
City late in 2014 are only the most recent examples), to the
constitutionality of legislation as sweeping as the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, the law ascends in its
hierarchy of decisions from the proper posting of a parking sign
to the definition of a tax that can be levied on non-participants
of a federal program for health care to the legal recognition of
marriage rights regardless of gender. For the majority of
individuals in modern society—and in our country—the law is
omnipresent, mysterious, and complex. As President Obama
indicated after the Ferguson verdict, we are “a Nation of
Laws.” The articulation of that phrase and its echoes of the

5
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Founding Fathers was meant presumably to anchor the idea
once again for the population most dissatisfied with the latest
outcome of the process. Emphasizing the long view, reminding
people of the sustained arc of progress that is the result of
American civil jurisprudence, is a tough sell against the
immediacy of the moment.5 Kafka would have understood this
dilemma and known that any pronouncement of the
hagiography of the law and its systems would have rung hollow
to people who do not believe it has relevance to them.
In a private musing in his notebook, unpublished during
his lifetime (and only escaping loss because his friend Max
Brod disobeyed his orders to burn his manuscripts6), Kafka
attempts to work out the power and the relevance of the law.
In a section entitled “The Problem with Our Laws,” he writes:
“Our laws are not generally known; they are kept secret by the
small group of nobles who rule us. We are convinced that these
ancient laws are scrupulously administered; nevertheless, it is
an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does
not know.”7 Moreover, the existence of these laws is called into
question because of the ancient nature of their sources:
The very existence of these laws, however, is at
most a matter of presumption. There is a
tradition that they exist and that they are a
mystery confided to the nobility, but it is not and
cannot be more than a mere tradition sanctioned
by age, for the essence of a secret code is that it
should remain a mystery. Some of us among the
people have attentively scrutinized the doings of
the nobility since the earliest times and possess
records made by our forefathers—records which
we have conscientiously continued—and claim to
recognize amid the countless number of facts
5. Michael Eric Dyson points out that “President Obama said that our
nation was built on the rule of law. That is true, but incomplete. His life,
and his career, too, are the product of broken laws.” Michael Eric Dyson, OpEd., Where Do We Go After Ferguson?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2014, at SR1.
6. It is worth noting that the ownership of the manuscripts have
themselves been the subject of over fifty years’ worth of legal dispute. See
Elif Batuman, Kafka’s Last Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2010, at MM34.
7. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 482.
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certain main tendencies which permit of this or
that historical formulation; but when in
accordance with these scrupulously tested and
logically ordered conclusions we seek to adjust
ourselves somewhat for the present or the future,
everything becomes uncertain, and our work
seems only an intellectual game, for perhaps
these laws that we are trying to unravel do not
exist at all.8
For Kafka, the logical application of precedence and tradition
dissolves into an “intellectual game” because of uncertainty so
severe that the very existence of the law is put to question.
And yet, both K. from The Trial and the Man from the Country
in “Before the Law” illustrate persistence above all else, and I
think that is part of the draw of Kafka’s work. Despite
innumerable “difficulties not expected,” K. presses on with
determination to understand the case against him. There is
something simultaneously brutal and hopeful about this
persistence. Its brutality is emphasized by Kafka in both the
story, where the Man from the Country’s failing ears only just
catch the final pronouncement of the Doorkeeper, and in The
Trial by the ignominious end (“Like a Dog!”) for K. The
inexorable tension between the protagonist and the system is
at the heart of the conflict, and while the cynic reads Kafka’s
plot as the accurate barometer of the relationship because the
protagonist is crushed, the optimist will say these figures—or
those who follow them—will eventually win by improving the
world. Questioning the law, after all, is how it is remade. The
key word here is “eventually.”
II.

Days and Years

The dominant literary trope of the law is delay. Kafka
knew this intellectually, having received his Doctor of Law
degree in 1906 from Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague. He
also knew this from practical experience, having worked at an
insurance company and a quasi-governmental entity managing
8. Id. at 482.
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insurance claims.9 In Kafka’s works I am referencing here, the
Man from the Country and K. are both outlasted by the law, a
theme central to both works. Kafka knew this was a literary
trope, of course. In Hamlet, the only work of Shakespeare’s his
diaries critique,10 the Prince’s most famous soliloquy argues for
“self-slaughter” with the following:
For who would bear the whips and scorns of
time,
Th’ oppressor’s wrong, the proud man’s
contumely,
The pangs of despised love, the law’s delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th’ unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin?
(I,3:71-77)11
Kafka also found solace in the English novelist Charles
Dickens even while he criticized a certain “heartlessness to his
sentimentally overflowing style.”12 The law’s delay is famously
the main metaphor for Dickens’ Bleak House, which opens with
the description of the London fog more a manifestation of
Chancery courts than the regional atmosphere:
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows
among green aits and meadows; fog down the
river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of
shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great
(and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on
the Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the
9. Glen, supra note 2, at 8-9.
10. See FRANZ KAFKA, DIARIES: 1910-1923 343 (Max Brod ed., Schocken
Books, 1988). On September 29, 1915, he writes “How could Fortinbras say
that Hamlet had prov’d most royally?” Id. at 200. On the 3rd of April, 1912
he writes of having “brought my sister home from Hamlet.” Id.
11. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF HAMLET act 3, sc. 1.
12. See KAFKA, supra note 10, at 388 (October 8, 1917 entry). For
Kafka’s Amerika as a “retort to Dickens,” see NEIL CORNWELL, THE ABSURD IN
LITERATURE 197 (2006).
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cabooses of collier-brigs; fog lying out on the
yards, and hovering in the rigging of great ships;
fog drooping on the gunwales of barges and small
boats. Fog in the eyes and throats of ancient
Greenwich pensioners, wheezing by the firesides
of their wards; fog in the stem and bowl of the
afternoon pipe of the wrathful skipper, down in
his close cabin; fog cruelly pinching the toes and
fingers of his shivering little ‘prentice boy on
deck. Chance people on the bridges peeping over
the parapets into a nether sky of fog, with fog all
round them, as if they were up in a balloon, and
hanging in the misty clouds.13
“At the very heart of the fog,” Dickens continues, “sits the Lord
High Chancellor in his High Court of Chancery.”14
The common theme is the inaccessibility of the law from
the common man: in Shakespeare it is the delay in its
effectiveness (and perhaps insolence in administration); in
Dickens its access is managed by the educated elite for the
purposes of their own enrichment; in Kafka, it appears as the
mechanism of the faceless bureaucracy whose motives are not
known. In all cases, the law is a force that is relentless and
without benefit to the vast majority of the populace.
Kafka also shares a sense of humor about the law with
Shakespeare and Dickens.
But where Shakespeare’s is
character-specific (think of Falstaff’s disregard for the regimen
of the law or Henry V’s enforcement of it) and Dickens applies
his with a moral weight of thematic purpose (where the
Chancery lawyers are the carbuncles of the system of
bureaucratic oppression), Kafka’s humor anchors his work in
the realm of the absurd. The very phrase describing the Man
from the Country’s wait—”There he sits for days and years”
(my emphasis)—pairs a coordinating conjunction and
contradiction that makes the parable possible by linking the
mundane with the miraculous. A few moments in time become

13. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 11 (Norman Page ed., Penguin
Books 1971) (1853).
14. Id. at 12.
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a lifetime, and a story becomes a parable. For Kafka to do it in
a single line with a perfectly even tone—the assertion of the
impossible as normal—presages the Absurdist movement.15
And yet the work has its roots firmly set in the end of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, evidenced by the formality of the
guard and his Tartar beard and fur collar, among other details.
Kafka reaches backwards and forwards with seeming
effortlessness, a point David Foster Wallace has highlighted as
the discrete sensibility of his humor:
What Kafka’s stories have, rather, is a grotesque,
gorgeous, and thoroughly modern complexity, an
ambivalence that becomes the multivalent Both/
And logic of the, quote, “unconscious,” which I
personally think is just a fancy word for soul.
Kafka’s humor— not only not neurotic but antineurotic, heroically sane— is, finally, a religious
humor, but religious in the manner of
Kierkegaard and Rilke and the Psalms, a
harrowing spirituality against which even Ms.
[Flannery] O’Connor’s bloody grace seems a little
bit easy, the souls at stake pre-made.16
Kafka’s “religious” humor in the parable and its ageless
modernity is underlined by its possible Talmudic roots, “found
in a traditional Jewish Midrash-legend on Moses who, on his
way to Sinai, had to overcome four Angels/Gate-keepers to get
access to the Torah.”17 And Kafka’s connection of the mythical
roots of our anxiety with the modern world—where spiritual
quests are transformed into menial servitude and holy
knowledge is replaced with endless bureaucratic operations—
highlights a dilemma of interpretation. Are the religious
paradigms corrupted by modernity? Or does modernity reveal
15. For Kafka as a precursor to the wider international Absurdist
Movement, see CORNWELL, supra note 12, at 184-214.
16. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, CONSIDER THE LOBSTER: AND OTHER ESSAYS
(2005).
17. Dražen Pehar, Herodotus, Kafka before the Law, and Ambiguity as
an
Engine
of
Narrative
Plot,
ACADEMIA.EDU,
https://www.academia.edu/2008999/Herodotus_Kafka_before_the_Law_and_a
mbiguity_as_an_engine_of_narrative_plot (last visited May 5, 2015).
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them as empty manipulative functions by stripping them of
myth? The similarity of circumstance between the ancient and
the modern, the secular and the religious, the bureaucrat and
the priest—where one would expect vast difference—is where
Kafka’s dark ironic humor lies.
III. Radiance That Streams Inextinguishably
And yet, when the laughs die down, there is an emptiness
that yawns, and a fear that this world view may lead to
nothing but a cold grave. If the rituals have been corrupted, or
simply recognized as insipid, what are the implications for the
role of rite or the function of the parable’s form? For Kafka, the
form of the parable was unstable, and yet, it was this very
characteristic that made it dynamic and so suitable for the
complexities of his mind. In his notebooks he penned a brief
section “On Parables” in which he laid out the conundrum of
parables with a precise logical clarity:
MANY complain that the words of the wise are
always merely parables and of no use in daily
life, which is the only life we have. When the
sage says: “Go over,” he does not mean that we
should cross to some actual place, which we could
do anyhow if the labor were worth it; he means
some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us,
something that he cannot designate more
precisely either, and therefore cannot help us
here in the very least. All these parables really
set out to say merely that the incomprehensible
is incomprehensible, and we know that already.
But the cares we have to struggle with every day:
that is a different matter.18
He then continues the passage, which devolves into chaotic
subjective conversation that blurs the line between reality and
parable, notebook observation and fictional dramatic narrative.
It is as if the theoretical idea behind the parable deconstructs
18. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 506.
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into an argument in his head:
Concerning this a man once said: Why such
reluctance? If you only followed the parables you
yourselves would become parables and with that
rid of all your daily cares.
Another said: I bet that is also a parable.
The first said: You have won.
The second said: But unfortunately only in
parable.
The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have
lost.19
This quick leap from reason to imagination—or logical order to
chaos—is typical of Kafka’s style throughout his canon. This is
a repetition of what might be called his own “intellectual
game.” For Kafka, who did not subscribe to religious faith and
also eschewed political theory, there was something endlessly
compelling about the interrogative, the nature of query and
response, the drive to get at the source of the matter. Max
Brod describes the dynamic he saw at play in Kafka’s mind as
conscientia
scrupulosa—“unimaginably
precise
conscientiousness”:
It revealed itself in all questions of a moral
nature, where he could never overlook the
slightest shadow of any injustice that occurred.
From the very beginning one is reminded of the
debates in the Talmud; this method of reasoning
was foreshadowed there too; at the same time, he
didn’t get to know the Talmud itself until much
later on in life. Many of his works exhibit this
trait, for example . . . the great scene in The
Trial, in which the legend “Before the Law” is
discussed from various angles.20
As a student, Kafka tried alternative courses of study,
19. KAFKA, supra note 4, at 506.
20. KAFKA, supra note 10, at 47.
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including chemistry, philosophy, literature and philology, all to
no avail. Eventually he came to the realization that a course of
study in law was what he needed to pursue because it would
provide him the means to support himself.21 His favorite
courses had been literature, but law or medicine were the only
career options and law was, despite its drudgery, the better
alternative. However, any potential intellectual solace in its
investigation was stymied by his circumstances, which limited
his options of study to Karl-Ferdinand University in Prague.
As Ernst Pavel points out, as an institution of legal instruction
Karl-Ferdinand “seems to have fallen considerably short of
even the far from exalted standards prevailing in the more
prestigious institutions of the empire” by being “shaped by its
function”:
The purpose of this German law school,
operating in an alien and increasingly hostile
environment, was to turn out cadres of
bureaucrats equipped to enforce centralized
power in peripheral outposts of the empire. And
in this task, which imposed no great strain on
mediocre minds, it appears to have been
reasonably successful.22
While the natural elements of what Brod identified as Kafka’s
“Talmudic mind” might have appreciated the law as an
“intellectual game,” his personal circumstances would not allow
it. Biographers have illustrated that Kafka was exposed to the
variety of social, political, and philosophical theories the early
twentieth century provided, and as a marginalized Czech in the
Austro-Hungarian Empire and a Jew in a Europe hurtling
toward its worst manifestation of anti-Semitism, he knew the
challenges that were brewing. He was, however, steadfast in
his refusal to align with any of the main anodynes his friends
and colleagues were espousing, from Psychoanalysis to Zionism
to Socialism:

21. Glen, supra note 2, at 27-8.
22. ERNST PAWEL, THE NIGHTMARE
118 (1992).
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Abstract ideas, whether in philosophy, politics, or
religion, were at best of marginal and passing
interest to him. He was never a systematic
thinker; the very notion of a closed system, in
fact, must have seemed repellent. Neither formal
logic nor synthetic dogma offered any meaningful
clues to the mysteries of the universe that
preoccupied him, and he had yet to discover his
own proper way of dealing with them. In the
meantime, he avidly fished in the main currents
of nineteenth-century thought and used
whatever seemed helpful to the precariously
emerging self. Yet the very skepticism which
rendered him receptive to these ideas— and was
reinforced by them in turn— also inevitably led
him to question their validity and reject them in
short order.23
In a perfect world, one might posit that a secular approach for
managing conflict based on precedent—a system of law, in
other words—might have been the best solution for an
intellectual of Kafka’s disposition.
Neither religious nor
political, it might have been the natural answer for him. The
central primacy of the law in his work, I think, speaks to his
attraction to this ideal. The law’s placement as an entity under
which all operate underscores its ability to cut across the socioeconomic, religious, and political landscape that is always in
flux, and which was dramatically in flux in Kafka’s own time.
That the system under which all are supposed to be equal is reimagined into a phantasmagorical nightmare of bureaucracy
where all are equally oppressed is a critical element of what
makes Kafka’s work so powerful. No nightmare is more
haunting than the one that corrupts the potential ideal.
IV. Made Only For You
In August of 1989, I got a call from my father, who told me
that he was enrolling in law school at Chicago Kent School of
23. Id. at 70.
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Law. He was doing this because he lost a bet with my Uncle
Robert, who challenged my father to take the LSAT cold and
apply. The deal struck was that if accepted, he had to go; if
rejected, he was free to continue his life without the degree. If
you knew anything about my uncle, you would know he was
born to litigate, and a law degree was the natural end-point for
a career that had started in the boxing ring, included a
midnight enlistment in the Army, a stint in dental school and a
successful career as a periodontist—all of which led up to his
eventual discovery of a career where logic replaced brawn and
he could choose the fights he would undertake rather than
fight to defend the work he had already done. My father, on
the other hand, is someone who endured law school to honor
his bet (a blood-honor at that), but considers it a high
distinction to have his sheepskin unsullied by any actual
practice of law. Back when he entered into this arrangement,
which he announced by phone from Chicago to me in my New
York City apartment, I knew this would be the case. The first
thing I did was pull an edition of Kafka off the shelf and read to
him “Before the Law.” By the time I finished we were both
laughing hysterically, and I remember trying to read the last
words of the Doorkeeper through the tears rolling out of my
eyes. And then, after a few moments, we fell quiet, said our
goodbyes and good lucks, and hung up. I couldn’t have
articulated it at the time, but I think Kafka’s parable laid out
for us the power of the law as an ideal, its reverential place in
society, and the humility and dedication needed to approach its
study. In other words, we both knew my father was leaving the
country to go see the Doorkeeper.
Since that phone call my father has completed his degree
and my Uncle Robert has passed away after a brief but
successful career as a barrister. My own career has taken me
from the classroom into various administrative offices,
including one as Provost and Executive Vice President of Pace
University, where I oversaw the Law School, chaired the
Dean’s search committee that brought Michelle Simon into the
position, and worked on various initiatives to engage the
University with the leadership that the Law School provided on
issues such as sustainability, professional education, and land
use, among others. I moved on to Marist College in 2010, but
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the experience of engaging with Michelle and the Law School
community has stayed with me.
And as I have thought about that experience—and Kafka,
and the crazy iterations of the law in our world—I have grown
to appreciate the significance of an individual’s or an
institution’s persistence in striving to ensure the world
maintains a semblance of balance about the law so that we do
not end up like the Man from the Country or Josef K., outside
of the operations of the law and without meaningful
engagement and understanding of it. The foundation of the
law—especially the ideal of equal treatment under the law—is
exactly what makes legal education so critical to the health of
society.
Understanding the singular relationship each
individual has with the law is at the heart of civil rights,
criminal and even environmental law. That each individual
case builds precedent for future law, the signature of our
common law system, is uniquely powerful. It is at the heart of
a healthy legal system and, arguably, society.
The understanding of these principles, equal treatment
under law and legal precedent, is what great teachers of law
endeavor to provide, and great institutions. Personally, I think
Franz Kafka inherently understood these but could never
accept them as beneficial. It may be that he never would have
accepted them, even if his circumstances had allowed it.
However, I can’t help but imagine that more latitude to explore
the “intellectual game” that fascinated him as a theme and a
central plot device—and of course a more receptive and
innovative university in which to study the law—might have
altered the course of his thinking. I don’t think anyone would
trade Kafka’s artistic output in return for that possibility, but
it is an intriguing one to contemplate.
The point of this rumination is that Kafka’s struggles are a
clear example of how the law is at the center of our
understanding of self and other, a principle illustrated from the
lessons of the Talmud to the latest Supreme Court docket. It
defines our history—our relations with the “nobles” out of
whose machinations it arose—as well as our future, crafted by
those whose attraction to its “intellectual game” and whose
individual persistence will allow them to shape it for those who
come after. It is for these reasons that, in thinking about what

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss4/1
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I might explore in honor of Michelle Simon, Franz Kafka’s
parable “Before the Law” came to mind. While it is true that
she, as any administrator, has found herself in the midst of
Kafkaesque scenarios that have befuddled her, and it is true,
especially from a faculty member’s perspective, that she has
appeared to be in the center of arranging such scenarios,24 the
fact of the matter is that her leadership as Dean and dedication
to the mission of Pace University School of Law to achieve a
more just society has helped illuminate the law and increase
access to it for tens of thousands of its students, alumni, and
probably millions of their clients. This volume is rife with
examples of what Michelle Simon has done for that purpose,
and especially what Pace Law School has accomplished with
Michelle as a colleague and at the helm. Many of us know
what her leadership as a scholar, teacher, administrator, and
as a woman has done for Pace, the region, and the legal
profession. What this essay hopes to achieve is to accent the
celebration of that accomplishment with the recognition that
her work is connected to and contributing to the great
conversation we have been having about the law since we first
started speaking in parables.

24. This is, of course, inescapable as an administrator.
sources are too numerous to cite.
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